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  1EFFICIENCY LOSS AND TRADABLE PERMITS   
 
Introduction 
Theoretically, using incentive-based policies, such as a tradable permit system, for 
pollution control has been shown to be cost-effective (Baumol and Oates, 1988). A 
series of empirical studies have indicated that substantial cost-savings could be 
achieved by implementing a tradable permits system. (e.g. Atkinson and Lewis 1971; 
Maloney, and Yandle 1984; Krupnik 1986; Johnson and Pekelney 1996). Atkinson and 
Titenberg (1991), on the other hand, pointed out that actual savings from trading 
programs might be lower than expected due to a sequential and bilateral trading 
process and non-uniformly mixed pollutants. Burtraw, Harrison and Turner (1998) 
argued that divergence between the cost-minimizing and the observed pattern of 
permit trading may be due to the informal structure of many trading programs, 
incomplete assignation of permits and uncertainty of the trading program length. One 
added advantage of using tradable permits is that any initial misallocation of pollution 
permits can be remedied through trading. In the case of perfect competition and full 
information, initial allocation of permits has no role in the market equilibrium 
formation and the same environmental goal can be achieved under any allocation as 
long as the total number of permits issued remains the same (Montgomery 1972). 
Beside the actual trading costs, preliminary works for establishing a trading 
program may also increase the cost of permit trading. For example, a new program 
requires agreement on (1) the universe of covered sources, (2) baseline emission 
levels, (3) the emissions cap and planned rate of decline, (4) the allocation of emission 
allowances and (5) standardize monitoring and measurement techniques for 
determining each source’s emissions. These administration costs may be substantial 
when the number of affected sources is large. Experience with the Regional Clean Air 
Incentives Market (RECLAIM) and the Acid Rain program shows that obtaining the 
agreement on these points can take several years. 
Another factor that may also reduce the potential cost-saving of permit systems 
is the indivisibility and irreversibility of investment on control equipment. This factor 
is largely neglected in the permit trading literature. Usually, emissions can be reduced 
by using less polluting inputs, cleaning up after emission is generated at the 
end-of-the-pipe or installing better and cleaner technologies which lower emissions 
during the production process. For some equipments, the amount of pollution 
reduction depends only on the control capacity of that equipment and firms’ actual 
pollution level. Once the equipment has been installed, it will always perform at a 
constant removing rate without incurring extra operating costs as long as the emission 
levels are within the capacity range. That is, firms’ actual emission reduction levels 
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Firms’ decisions on whether adopting a control equipment and how much the capacity 
of the equipment should be are the key factors determining the amount of pollution 
reduction. However, the control capacity of an equipment may not always be divisible 
(continuous). In reality firms can adopt a control equipment with appropriate size that 
closely matches their quantity of pollution and environmental standards. Therefore, 
when the amount of reduced emission from the installed equipment exceeds the 
standard, the trading market will be in excess supply of permits. The efficiency loss 
from offering too many permits than needed may result from over investment on 
equipment (or discontinuity of control capacity). Using the Kaohsiung and Pingtung 
county as an example, the major base for heavy industries in Taiwan, this study tries 
to estimate the possible efficiency loss that may arise from over investment on control 
equipment if a permit trading system was used to regulate Nitrogen Dioxide (NOx) 
emissions in this area. 
The efficiency loss may be substantial in a trading market for NOx control. The 
costs of NOx control technologis can be categorized into two groups, namely 
capital-based and control-based. Cichanowicz et. al. (1991) indicated that the cost 
associated with the use of a Low NOx Burner (LNB) may comprise 95% to 99% 
capital and 1% to 5% operating and management expenses. Firms cannot adjust their 
emission reduction levels once a certain size of LNB has been adopted. On the 
contrary, Selective Catalytic Recircular (SCR) -another equipment often used for NOx 
control, would be approximately 40% to 50% capital and 50% to 60% operating and 
maintaining expense. When SCR is installed, firms are allowed to adjust their 
emission reduction levels through switching catalyst as long as the emission levels are 
within the SCR’s control capacity. That is, pollution can be further reduced by paying 
higher variable costs. Even though the control efficiency and flexibility of SCR is 
higher than LNB, high installing and operating costs of SCR have limited their use 
only to certain industries (such as petroleum refinery). 
Technology adoption is an important decision variable for firms. The cost per 
unit abatement depends largely on the extent to which the emission control 
equipments are utilized. Thus, the costs per unit of abatement are determined 
endogenously and simultaneously with technology adoption, equipment utilization, 
and permit buy/sell decisions. The fixed cost issue was not properly dealt with in the 
permit trading literature. Most studies used the marginal analysis approach, that 
incorporates a constant variable cost (including the operating costs and annualized 
fixed costs) for each permit unit, assuming that firms can control the amount of 
pollution reduction. However, when a particular technology is not used with its full 
potential or the life of the permit trading program is shorter than the lifetime of 
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underestimate both the cost and the market price of permits. Hence, they tend to 
underestimate the costs of abatement faced by firms and overstate the cost-savings 
resulting from permit trading programs. If an emission reduction technology (or 
equipment) is expensive, many firms would opt to buy emission permits rather than 
install that technology unless the equipment has a long lifetime.   
This study presents a methodology that incorporates the independent, optimizing 
behavior of individual participants of a new trading market in Taiwan. To accomplish 
this objective, a price endogenous dynamic mathematical programming model will be 
developed that simulates the firms’ behavior and determines the efficiency loss, 
optimal technology adoption and permit trading decisions. 
KPERMS - Background   
Kaohsiung and Pingtung county is the main area where the electric and gas, 
paper, fabric and metal, manufacturing, petroleum refining and chemicals industries 
are concentrated. Its booming industrial activities in the past 20 years have made the 
county a major base for Taiwan's industrial development. However, the emission of 
NOx from these highly polluted industries has often caused the air quality fail to meet 
the standards and lead to serious health damages. As opposed to the early days’ 
command and control policy, Taiwan has adopted an incentive-based instrument to 
revise the air pollution control regulations in recent years. For example, an air 
pollution fee was introduced in 1995 to ensure that air quality in Taiwan can reach a 
comparable level to that of developed nations. In addition, the Environmental 
Protection Administration (EPA) of Taiwan has further promulgated that, in 2007 
Kaohsiung-Pintung area will launch the first tradable permit system for NOx control. 
The program is so called the Kaohsiung-Pintung emission reduction market system 
(KPERMS).  
The EPA plans to set gradually tightening emission standards and continues to 
promote improvement of air quality through KPERMS. However, the affected sources 
are very concerned about the new trading program. This is because improved 
emission reduction technologies are sometimes very expensive to install
1 and  are 
typically lumpy or indivisible. Thus, no contentious agreement has been made so far 
about the details of KPERMS such as the target reduction levels, duration of permits 
and extension to which firms should be included in the program.   
Even though the draft of KPERMS has not been finalized, it is natural to assume 
that this program will follow the features of the existing programs such as RECLAIM 
and Acid Rain Program. Thus, in this study we assume that the future trading program 
                                                 
1  Chu (1998) present examples with installation costs over one million $US. 
  4will also be a “cap and trade” regime and the “grandfathering” rule will be used for 
initial permit allocation. We assume that each firm will be required to reduce its 
emission by 10% of its baseline, which is determined by the firms’ NOx emission 
levels in the year 2000, Each permit, called Emission Reduction Credit (ERC), gives 
the firm the right to emit one ton of NOx. When the firm’s actual emission is lower 
than the initial permit allocation or the emission reduction is greater than the required 
amount, the firm is allowed to sell the unused permits. Unused permits cannot be 
banked for future use to prevent the possibility of a hot spot problem in this area. In 
order to lower possible transaction costs and to avoid monopoly, we further assume 
that mandatory participants of this system are those firms with historical annual NOx 
emissions of 5 tons or above. Smaller firms that are excluded from KPERMS will be 
regulated under the current air pollution fee system.   
The Model 
In order to determine an efficient technology adoption and trading pattern, a 
mixed-integer programming model is developed. The model reflects the perspective 
of a social planner who wants to achieve the targeted emission reduction levels in the 
most economical way. The objective of the social planner’s model is to minimize the 
total emission control cost, including variable costs of technology use and fixed costs 
of installing equipments, by all firms. Each firm can either choose to install an 
expensive but more efficient technology to comply with its emission reduction 
requirement and sell excess permits or buy required permits from other participants in 
the market. The model assumes that all these decisions are controlled by the social 
planner who has full information about the individual producers’ cost structure. This 
means implicitly that all participants cooperate among themselves and with the social 
planner to adopt the socially optimum solution. Clearly this is not a true 
representation of the reality, but the purpose here is to determine a socially optimum 
solution which provides a benchmark against other alternatives.   
A mathematical representation of the social planner’s model is given as follows: 
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The notation used in the model is described below:   
F, T, N, Y denote firm, technology, length of the planning horizon, and year, 
respectively;  δ is the discount factor; 
t f T cos   is the fixed cost of installing technology T; 
t v FT cos   is the variable cost of installing technology T by firm F; 
USEFTY is the utilization rate of technology T by firm F in year Y; 
FY BUY and , are the amounts of ERCs bought and sold by firm F in year Y;  FY SELL
SURPLUS FY   is the amount of ERCs that cannot be sold (or expired) by firm F in 
year Y; 
lim emis FY is the required reduction of NOx by firm F in year Y; 
emisFT   is the NOx reduction if technology T is used by firm F; 
baselineF is the baseline emission level of firm F; 
FYT D   is a binary variable indicating whether or not technology T is adopted by firm 
F in year T; 
USEFTY , ,  and  FY BUY FY SELL SURPLUS FY   are all variable that are greater than or 
equal to zero.   
The objective function (1) represents the total cost of emission control. The 
first term in the summation is the total variable cost resulting from the use of all 
technologies adopted by the firms, while the second term represents the total fixed 
cost of installing required equipments during the planning horizon. Variable costs are 
defined as costs per ton of pollution reduction. It is determined by each firm’s 
utilization rate of a given technology and depends on the efficiency of that technology 
which may vary from firm to firm. Firms will incur no variable costs when LNB is 
installed. The fixed cost involves annualized fixed costs assuming that most producers 
would finance expensive equipments through bank loans and pay the total cost in 
partial installments. Emission control equipments are durables and can be used 
beyond the planning horizon. To reflect the cost and benefit situation during the 
planning horizon, annual costs are incorporated in the model. Note, however, that 
annualized fixed costs would be incurred throughout the entire planning horizon once 
equipments are installed. The parameter    measures the abatement efficiency 
defined as the percentage emission reduction provided by technology T for firm F.   
emisFT
Equation (2) regulates the annual emission level for each firm. It means that at 
the end of each year, in order to satisfy the EPA’s regulation, each firm must have 
enough ERCs in hand to match its seasonal emission level. ERCs can be generated by 
installing cleaner technology or by purchasing through market transactions. These two 
sources on the left hand side of (2) constitute the supply side of ERCs. The permits 
generated thereby can either be used to fulfill the required reduction, or sold to other 
  6firms. However, unsold permits may create an excess supply in the market which is 
captured by the variableSURPLUS FY . When  SURPLUS FY
SURPLU
  equals zero, then the 
trading market will be in equilibrium (or cleared). If 0 f S FY  this  implies 
that the environmental quality is over achieved. This is because firms may have 
generated more ERCs than needed. Since firms cannot adjust their emission reduction 
level once LNB is chosen, the model may not be solved without adding this variable. 
For any firm, it includes the amount of ERCs sold and used by the firm to cover the 
required emission reduction by the EPA.   
Equation (3) implies that the total buy and sell of ERCs have to be balanced. 
However, this equation is unlike the equilibrium constraint employed in the permit 
trading studies presented in the literature. It can only be interpreted as an equilibrium 
constraint if the variableSURPLUS FY in equation (2) is zero.   
Equation (4) is a technical constraint which ensures that each technology can be 
installed only once during the planning horizon. Once an equipment is adopted it can 
be used for the remaining years. 
Data: 
The database required in the social planner’s model, including total emissions in the 
year 2000 for the projected KPERMS participants, technical description of the 
KPERMS sources and control efficiency of add-on control technologies available to 
these sources, is provided by the EPA. The emissions data set covers 42 firms which 
account for approximately 52% of the region’s NOx emissions from point sources. 
Since the actual total emission level in the entire Kaoshiung-Pingtung county is about 
two times higher than the value used in this study (due to the unavailable data for 
excluded firms), the minimum total cost of the program will be extrapolated to 
determine the total cost for the entire area.   
Other cost and engineering data used in the simulation come from engineering 
studies by the EPA. KPERMS is assumed to be a 5-year program, therefore using the 
same baseline emission level to project future actual emissions may not be fully 
representative. In the simulations we used the past emission records to estimate 
potential emissions for the period 2007-2011. Since each firms’ past emission records 
show no certain upward or downward trend, we assumed that the actual emission 
levels in the planning horizon would follow a uniform distribution whose lower and 
upper bounds are the extreme values observed during 1995-2000. 
According to the EPA’s technical report (1998), LNB is considered as the best 
available control technology for power generation, paper, petroleum refining and 
chemical industries. SCR, on the other hand, is the most cost-effective equipment for 
steel and some petroleum refining industries compared with other add-on control 
  7equipment. Therefore, this study assumes LNB and SCR as the only add-on
2 
equipments that will be used by the firms. Based on each firm’s size and emission 
records, the available size of LNB or SCR is determined up front. Thus, firms only 
have to make Yes/No decisions on technology adoption. The total cost of these control 
systems includes fixed costs and variable costs. Fixed costs are the costs of 
purchasing and installing equipment and are defined as total capital investment costs 
by the EPA’s NOx control cost manual (1998). Variable costs incorporate the required 
labor and fuel costs for running the machine. A capital recovery factor (CRF)
3 with  a 
6 percent interest rate and 10-year machine life is used to calculate the annualized 
fixed and variable costs. 
Results 
Two scenarios are considered in the simulation. The first scenario assumes that the 
actual emission levels for firms in the 5-year planning horizon, i.e. 2007-2011, are the 
same as their year 2000 baseline emissions. The second scenario assumes that the 
actual emission levels will vary and are estimated using the previous emission records. 
Besides the 10% reduction rule from the baseline level, we further simulate a 
condition in which 20% reduction is required in both scenarios. The purpose of the 
20% reduction rule is to evaluate the economic cost of a more stringent environmental 
standard.  
In the first scenario where the emission level is stable and the 10% reduction 
rules is applied, about 10,184 units of ERC (9 % of the total ERCs issued by the EPA) 
would be traded each year. Most KPERMS participants would be buyers in the market. 
Only two firms, Taiwan Power and Taiwan Plastic companies, would adopt new 
control equipment and become the only suppliers in the market. Both of these firms 
would install LNB for NOx Control. However, they would generate more ERCs than 
the market demand, which leads to an excess supply of 498.1 units of ERC. Since the 
market is not cleared, the social planner’s model would not result in a market 
equilibrium. Excess supply of permits also implies that the environmental standards 
are over-achieved. The total discounted abatement cost for the KPERMS over the 
5-year planning horizon would be approximately $3.7 million. Since the firms’ 
emission levels, annualized fixed and variable costs are the same during the planning   
                                                 
2  “Add-on” systems are equipments installed downstream of an air pollution source to control its 
emissions. 









 where r is interest rate and n is the use life for each 
equipment. 
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Table 1: Results of the Social Planner’s Model in year 1 
  10% reduction  20% reduction 
Estimated Emission Level (ton)  72,859.3  72,859.3 
Required NOx reduction (ton)  7,285.9  14571.9 
Total ERCs issued (ton)  65,573.4  58287.5 
No. of ERCs traded (ton)  5,868.7  9274.9 
No. of unused ERCs (ton)  498.1  43.2 
No. of buyers in the market  42  40 
No. of sellers in the market  2  4 
No. of firms with technology adoption 2  4 
Annual abatement cost (in million)  0.74  1.2 
 
 
horizon, their behavior were the same through year-1 to year-5. Table 1 presents the 
simulation result for the first trading season only.   
When the required reduction rate is increased to 20%, the excess supply was 
reduced to only 43.2 tons. Two more firms from petroleum refining industries adopt 
new control equipments. The trading volume and total annual abatement cost were 
increased by 58% and 62%. Thus, a more stringent regulation rule on emission would 
dissipate the excess supply of ERCs. 
Applying the 10 % reduction rule in the second scenario, where firms’ actual 
emission levels were extrapolated based on their historical trends, the volume of 
traded ERCs was estimated as 17,458 units in the first year, which corresponds to 
roughly about 27 percent of the total ERCs issued (65,573.4 units). In the first trading 
season, 20 firms would be permit buyers while the other 24 firms would be sellers in 
the market. Among those 24 sellers, four firms adopted new technology. The firms   
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Table 2: Results of the Social Planner’s Model (10% reduction) 
  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5  Total 
Estimated  Emission  Level    (ton)  97,531.8 84,505.2 82,091.8 82,338.6 96,995.1  443,462.5
Required NOx  reduction  (ton)  31,958.4 18,931.7 16,518.4 16,765.2 31,421.7  115,595.4
Total ERCs issued (ton)  65,573.4  65,573.4  65,573.4  65,573.4  65,573.4  327,867.0
No. of ERCs traded    (ton)  17,458  9,752.2  15,280.7  16,763.2  13,945.8  73,199.9
No. of unused ERCs    (ton)  0  13,652  10,924.6  3,641.1  2,170.7  30,388.4
No. of buyers in the market  24  22  27  28  24  - 
No. of sellers in the market  20  22  17  16  20  - 
No. of firms with technology adoption  4  4  4  4  4  4 
Annual abatement cost (in million)  3.31 3.08 2.91 2.75 2.59  14.64 
 
 
investing in technology adoption in scenario-1 would again invest in control 
equipment in this scenario. The other two firms with new technology adoption were 
also from petroleum refinery and electric generating industries. Since the market is 
cleared in the first trading season, no firm with technology adoption would face an 
efficiency loss. 
Starting with year-2, some firms would not be able to sell their unused ERCs 
and the market was not cleared. Since the firms’ actual emission levels were 
determined differently, the unused ERCs were either from firms that adopted new 
equipment or from firms whose emission levels were lower than their initial ERC 
allocation levels. The amount of unused ERCs in year-2 was 13,652 tons, which is 
roughly 21% of the total issued ERCs. The substantial excess supply situation 
continued in year-3, although not being as severe (10,924 tons) due to the low actual   
  10 
Table 3: Results of the Social Planner’s Model (20% reduction) 
  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5  Total 
Estimated  Emission  Level    (ton)  97,531.8 84,505.2 82,091.8 82,338.6 96,995.1  443,462.5
Required NOx reduction (ton)  39244.4  26217.7  23804.3  24051.1  38707.6  152,025.1
Total ERCs issued (ton)  58287.5  58287.5  58287.5  58287.5  58287.5  291,437.5
# of ERCs traded    (ton)  16175.4  8538.3  12458.5  17265.8  11100.5  65,538.5
# of unused ERCs    (ton)  0  6366  3538.6  0  0  9,904.6
# of buyers in the market  24  25  30  29  28  - 
# of sellers in the market  20  19  14  15  16  - 
# of firms with technology adoption  5  5  5  5  5  5 
Annual abatement cost (in million)  4.99 4.61 4.35 4.13 3.91  21.99 
 
 
emission level by firms, but it was much lower in year-4 and year-5 where 3,600 and 
2,200 tons of ERC, respectively, could not be sold. The total abatement cost of the 
program was about $14.64 million under this scenario. Since the social planner’s 
model assumes perfect information and full cooperation among the firms, this cost 
corresponds to the minimum control cost for meeting the required NOx reduction. 
When the 20% rule is applied, the results indicate that the total abatement cost 
would increase to 22 million (Table 3). However, the total trading volume would be 
reduced significantly. Compared with the 10% rule, one more firm (in petroleum 
refining industry) would adopt new control technology (which was SCR) . Due to the 
higher abatement requirement, excess supply was eliminated except in years two and 
three. In the remaining years the market was in an equilibrium condition.     
The reason for the discrepancy between the findings of previous permit trading 
studies and this study is the existence of fixed costs associated with equipment 
  11installation in the example described here. In this case marginal analysis is not valid, 
and a large amount of installation cost may be incurred even for a small amount of 
permits to be generated. Neither the marginal nor the average cost may be equalized 
across firms. In the particular case of KPERMS, fixed costs constitute an important 
component of the problem, therefore the initial permit allocation may matter and can 




Unused ERCs may be interpreted as an efficiency loss. Such ERCs have two sources - 
one from firms that adopt new technology and the other from firms with higher initial 
allocation of permits than their actual emission levels. In this study, we only focus on 
the unused ERCs that stem from ove- investment of control equipment. Thus, 
efficiency loss will not be incurred by the firms whose unsold ERCs come from their 
own initial endowment. 
Due to the special features of LNB, the firms cannot fully control the amount of 
NOx reduction once the equipment is installed. Thus, some firms may over-comply 
the reduction target when they cannot sell all of their available permits. The efficiency 
loss is then defined as the costs of generating those unused ERCs
4. Table 2 shows that 
the Taiwan-Power and Taiwan Plastic companies are the two firms that would incur 
this type of efficiency loss in most cases. When the firms’ emission levels were 
constant and the 20% rule was employed, the total efficiency loss would be smaller 
because the number of unsold ERCs in this scenario would be small. When the firms’ 
emission levels were extrapolated differently and the 20% rule was used, we found 
that the total unsold ERCs would be much lower than that in the 10% rule. However, 
the unsold ERCs in this case come mainly from China Petroleum company that adopts 
SCR which leads to a large efficiency loss. 
The efficiency loss found here is not because of a bilateral trading process 
and/or insufficient information for finding trading partners, but it is due to not having 
full control ability of the installed equipment. In order to eliminate the efficiency loss, 
we further simulate two cases where banking is allowed. In the first case, we assumed 
that unused ERCs could be banked for one year. In the second case, no limit was 
imposed on the useful life of ERCs. The simulation results all indicated that extending 
the ERC life would not lower the efficiency loss. This is because firms adopting new 
technology were the same with or without banking. Thus, banking would only defer 
the efficiency loss from one year to another during the planning horizon.   
                                                 
4  Efficiency loss is equal to the unit abatement cost (annualized fixed costs of equipment divided by 
total NOx reduction.) multiplied by the amount of unused ERCs.   
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Table 4: Estimated Efficiency Loss (million) under two scenarios 
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4  Year 5  Total 
Scenario  1-  10%   Taiwan  Power(LNB)  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.17 
                T a i w a n   P l a s t i c ( L N B )    0.01  0.01  0.02 
Total  0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.19 
Scenario  1-  20%   Taiwan  Power(LNB)  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.008 
Taiwan Plastic(LNB)   0.001  0.001  0.002 
Total  0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002  0.01 
Scenario 2 – 10%    Taiwan Power(LNB)   0.63  0.17  0.80 
                T a i w a n   P l a s t i c ( L N B )      0.04     0.04 
Total   0.63  0.04  0.17  0.83 
Scenario 2 – 20% China Petroleum(SCR)   1.12      1.12 
Total   1.12      1.12 
 
 
Incorporating smaller firms into KPERMS might be another solution for the 
reducing efficiency loss, as this would increase the effective demand. The firms 
excluded in the trading program analysis here are currently subject to the air pollution 
fee regulation. If smaller firms can be incorporated in the market, then the relatively 
smaller demand for ERCs from these firms can successfully reduce the excess ERCs. 
Therefore, the government may consider a more flexible regime that allows smaller 
firms to switch conveniently between the permit trading system and the air pollution 
fee system when the price of those excess permit is lower than the fee they face. 
 
  13Conclusion 
An economic analysis of the KPERMS, which aims at reducing the air 
pollution in the Kao-shiung and Ping-tung county using a tradable permits system, is 
presented in this study. Two issues were of particular interest: i) investigate the 
economic impacts of the program on participating firms, and ii) analyze possible 
efficiency loss due to indivisibility of technology installation of firms in the permit 
market. A social planner’s model is developed to determine the socially optimum 
pollution abatement and trading strategy. An important feature that makes this study 
unique is the incorporation of discrete (binary) decision variables, namely technology 
adoption decisions, in an optimization model (a mixed integer program) that simulates 
the firms’ decision-making behavior. This characteristic is important because in the 
case of KPERMS the pollution control equipments are in general expensive and 
one-time fixed costs constitute an important component of the total costs and hence 
the firms’ decision-making. Therefore, the model is a more realistic representation of 
the actual decision problem than the conventional modeling approach seen in the 
permit trading literature where abatement costs involve variable costs only based on 
the simplifying assumption that once adopted the abatement technologies will be 
utilized at full capacity. In reality, the average cost of abatement under alternative 
technology options is endogenously determined depending on the firms’ decisions 
regarding the number of permits generated, purchased or sold or banked, all of which 
are determined by permit prices over the duration of the emission trading program. 
The result shows that when control equipment decisions are indivisible, an 
efficiency loss may arise due to over-investment. The option of banking unused ERCs 
to future periods would not eliminate the excess supply in the particular case study 
(KPERMS) presented here. Rather, it would only defer the efficiency loss to a future 
period. Whether a more stringent environmental standard can eliminate excess supply 
and decrease the efficiency loss depends on the number of firms participating in 
market, the firms’ emission levels, available control technologies and required 
reduction rates. When the number of firms is large and their choices over control 
equipment vary widely, such losses may disappear and the empirical findings 
obtained from the discrete analysis presented here would correspond more closely to 
those that would be obtained from a continuous analysis typically used in the 
traditional permit trading literature. In that case, the excess supply would diminish 
and the permit trading market would be close to equilibrium. In reality, each trading 
market focuses on one pollutant and the best available control equipment for that 
pollutant usually does not vary much. In that case the firms’ behavior in terms of 
choosing their control equipment would be more or less homogenous. However, even 
  14when the number of participants in the permit market is large, the efficiency loss may 
still occur.   
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